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SPECIAL EDUCATION AND THE PRIVATE
SCHOOL STUDENT: THE MISTAKE OF THE
IDEA AMENDMENTS ACT
I. INTRODUCrION
Until the mid-twentieth century, school boards did not allow child-
ren with disabilities to attend public schools because administrators
considered the costs excessive and the children uneducable.' In 1975,
Congress attempted to change this practice by passing the Education for
all Handicapped Children Act,2 ("EAHCA"), since renamed the Indi-
viduals with Disabilities Education Act3 ("IDEA" or "the Act").
Congress's passing of the IDEA was a major step in advancing the
rights of the disabled. Children afflicted with mental and physical dis-
abilities were no longer hidden away in institutions, but allowed to at-
tend public schools and receive the special education and related serv-
ices they needed. Unfortunately, the Act was ambiguous and resulted
in different interpretations by courts regarding the extent of coverage
for disabled students voluntarily attending private schools.
4
Until Congress's recent passage of the IDEA Amendments Act of
1997' (the "Amendments Act"), some courts restricted the IDEA re-
quirements, while others relied upon the Education Department Gen-
eral Administrative Regulations6 ("EDGAR" or "regulations") to or-
der school boards to provide services to disabled private school
children. The courts following EDGAR held that such services must be
provided where there would be no "significant additional costs . . .
borne by the state"7 and where the services will "neither add to nor sub-
1. See Joyce Martin, Comment, Special Education and the Non-Public School Child A
Handicap is a Non-Sectarian Condition, 5 LAW & INEQ. J. 549,554-55 (1987).
2. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
3. 20 U.S.C. § 1400-1460 (1994). The EAHCA, formerly known as the Education of the
Handicapped Act, was renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, which sub-
stituted the word "disabilities" for "handicapped" in several places. See Education of the
Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, § 901, 104 Stat. 1103, 1141-50
(1990).
4. See infra Part IV.
5. Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997).
6. 34 C.F.R. §§ 76,300 (1996). For a discussion of EDGAR, see infra Part II.
7. Russman v. Sobol, 85 F.3d 1050, 1056 (2d Cir. 1996), vacated, Board of Educ. of En-
larged Sch. Dist. of City of Watervliet, N.Y. v. Russman, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997).
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tract from the religious environment."8 Many private school children
benefited from the decisions of these courts by being able to attend the
school of their choice and still receive the assistance they needed.
On June 4, 1997, Congress delivered a major blow to the disabled by
passing the IDEA Amendments Act of 1997. The Amendments Act
essentially destroys a court's ability to require a school board to pay for
the education of a disabled child who voluntarily attends a private
school. Many children that the IDEA was designed to help will now be
unable to receive proper assistance due to costs their families are un-
able to bear.
This Comment examines the case law leading to Congress's passage
of the Amendments Act, with a focus on three recent decisions from the
Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits. Further, this Comment criticizes
the Amendments Act and proposes a more equitable solution for courts
faced with the task of interpreting the IDEA as it applies to private
school children. Part II outlines the sections of the IDEA, EDGAR,
and the Amendments Act relevant to funding for private school stu-
dents. Part III discusses how the Supreme Court has addressed Estab-
lishment Clause challenges regarding publicly funded programs pro-
vided on private school grounds, and Part IV analyzes three recent
circuit court decisions that attempted to determine whether the IDEA
requires on-site services for private school children. Finally, Part V ad-
dresses the need for congressional reevaluation of the Amendments Act
and proposes legislation outlining how a court should analyze a request
of a disabled private school student for special education and related
services under the IDEA. Absent some type of action, the long-term
effects the of IDEA Amendments Act will be devastating on the rights
of the disabled American child. Many disabled children voluntarily at-
tending private schools will be denied needed special education and re-
lated services at their schools.
II. BACKGROUND
In 1975, Congress passed the EAHCA, (now the IDEA), in an at-
tempt to unify the states' methods of -educating children with disabilities
and to guarantee every disabled child a "free appropriate public educa-
tion," ("FAPE").'0 The IDEA is designed to offer "full educational op-
8. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13 (1993).
9. Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997).
10. 20 U.S.C. §1400(c)(1994). The IDEA defines a "free appropriate public education"
as "special education and related services that.., have been provided at public expense ...
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portunit[ies] to all children with disabilities." '11 The Act attempts to ac-
complish this goal through the federal government's underwriting of a
portion of each child's educational costs.12 In turn, states receiving assis-
tance assure the federal government that each disabled child will have
access to a free appropriate public education'3 provided by the state in
the least restrictive environment.14 In addition, the free appropriate
public education must be based on. an "individualized education pro-
gram" designed specifically to meet the child's educational and disabil-
ity needs. 5
States participating in the program receive funds from the federal
government based on the number of qualified disabled students within
the state.'6 States distribute these funds to school boards according to
the individual needs of the disabled students within each school dis-
trict.17 In order to accommodate the individual needs of disabled stu-
dents, the IDEA provides that as an alternative to attending a public
school that has inadequate facilities, a disabled child may enroll in a
private school at no cost to the child's parents.'8 The decision of
whether the public school has inadequate facilities must be made "by
meet the standards of the State educational agency,. . . include an appropriate preschool,
elementary, or secondary school education .... and ... are provided in conforming with the
individual education program required under the IDEA." Id. § 1401(a)(18). See also Dixie
Snow Huefner, Judicial Review of the Special Educational Program Requirements Under the
Education For All Handicapped Children Ac" Where Have We Been and Where Should We
Be Going?, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 483,484-85 (1991).
11. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(A)(i).
12. See id. § 1411.
13. Id. § 1412(2)(B).
14. Id. § 1412(5)(B). This environment is one in which:
children with disabilities ... are educated with children who are not handicapped,
and that special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with dis-
abilities from their regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or
severity of the disability is such that education in regular classes with the use of
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.
Id.
15. Id. § 1401(20). The individualized education program requires that the proper edu-
cational representative, the teacher, the parents, and if appropriate, the child, develop a writ-
ten statement setting forth the following: (a) the child's present level of educational per-
formance, (b) annual goals and short-term objectives, (c) the services to be provided to the
child, both in special and regular educational programs, (d) any needed transition services,
(e) projected starting and ending dates, and (f) proper evaluation criteria, procedures, and
schedules to determine if the program goals are being met. Id.
16. See id. § 1411(a)(1).
17. For an example of how Wisconsin distributes funds received under the IDEA, see
WIS. STAT. § 115.88 (1995-96).
18. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(4)(B);34 C.F.R. § 300.401(a)(2).
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the state or appropriate local educational agency."19
The IDEA also provides for children voluntarily enrolled in private
schools by their parents, but on a different level then public school stu-
dents.2 Because the child is voluntarily placed in the private school by
his or her parents, the school district is not required to pay the student's
private school tuition21 but does have some responsibilities imposed on
it by EDGAR.n EDGAR states that school districts must "provide
students enrolled in private schools with a genuine opportunity for equi-
table participation" 23 in the special education programs. Benefits of the
private school programs "must be comparable in quality, scope, and op-
portunity for participation" to those received by public school stu-
dents.24
Many school boards supply the general opportunity for equitable
participation by requiring private school children to receive needed
services at a public school, a neutral facility, or a mobile trailer.' A
problem develops when a child's disability is such that he or she only
benefits from the service if it is provided during instruction. One such
disability is a hearing impairment. A child in need of a hearing assis-
tance device or sign language interpreter would find these services use-
less unless they were provided in his or her private school classroom.
Herein lies the issue that many lower courts have grappled with and
that Congress answered with the Amendments Act: whether the IDEA
requires a school board to provide special education and related serv-
ices at a private school for a voluntarily enrolled student.
While the IDEA specifically provides that voluntarily placed private
school children must have access to special education and related serv-
ices, neither its language or the language of EDGAR specify to what
extent a school board must pay for the services or whether the services
must be provided on-site. Congress clarified this issue through the
19. 20 U.S.C. & 1413 (a) (4) (B) (1).
20. The IDEA requires that States "to the extent consistent with the number and loca-
tion of children with disabilities in the state who are enrolled in private schools, provid[e] for
such children special education and related services." Id. § 1413(a)(4)(A). Similarly, the
regulations require that "[e]ach [local educational agency] shall provide special education
and related services designed to meet the needs of private school children with disabilities
residing in the jurisdiction of the agency." 34 C.F.R. § 300.452.
21. Id. § 300.403.
22. Id. §§ 76, 300.
23. Id. § 76.651(a)(1).
24. Id. § 76.654(a).
25. STEPHEN B. THOMAS & CHARLES J. Russo, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW-ISSUES &
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 90's 93 (1995).
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Amendments Act. The Amendments Act states that the IDEA "does
not require a local educational agency to pay for the cost of education,
including special education and related services, of a child with a dis-
ability at a private school of facility if that agency made a free appropri-
ate public education available to the child and the parents elected to
place the child in such private school or facility."' Essentially, the
Amendments Act eliminated a court's ability to require a school board
to pay for a private school student's special education, regardless of the
circumstances. Whether a disabled private school student's needs are
paid for is completely at the discretion of the school board.
Congress's interpretation of the IDEA appears contrary to what the
legislative history suggests regarding on-site program participation by
private school students. The legislative history suggests that Congress
intended on-site participation in the program by private school stu-
dents. In the Education of the Handicapped Amendments of 1974,
Congress attempted to specifically provide for private school students
by implementing a "bypass" programY If a school board was unable or
unwilling to provide for participation by private school students, the
Commissioner of Education was required to "bypass" the school board
and pay for the child's services directly.2
In 1983, the House more directly addressed the problem of limited
services offered to private school students by identifying the actual di-
lemma. Using Missouri law as an example, the House stated that the
prohibition of a state educational agency from offering special services
to private school children results in "local school systems only [being
able to] provide special services . . . before or after school hours, on
Saturdays and only on public school premises."' 9 This legislative history
suggests that Congress intended private school students to benefit from
the IDEA and did not intend to restrict these students to only off-site
services.
The Supreme Court has not offered any insight in interpreting Con-
gress's intent on the issue of where services under the IDEA must be
offered. It has only rendered an answer as to whether the services are
forbidden from being provided on parochial school grounds under the
Establishment Clauseo As outlined below, the Court has held that the
26. Id. at § 612(a)(10).
27. H.R. REP. No. 93-805 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4093,4109.
28. Id.
29. H.R. REP. No. 98-410, at 22 (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2088,2109.
30. See infra Part III-B., regarding the Supreme Court's decision in Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
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on-site provision under the IDEA does not violate the Constitution's
Establishment Clause.
III. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Although the Supreme Court has not given any direction as to
whether the IDEA requires a school board to provide on-site private
school special education and related services, it has resolved some re-
lated issues. Specifically, the Court has resolved issues relating to pos-
sible Establishment Clause violations of providing public funds to paro-
chial schools and their students. The Establishment Clause of the
United States Constitution states, "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion ....3 , This section of the First
Amendment prohibits the intertwining of religion and government,
commonly referred to as mixing church and state. As discussed below,
many school boards have contended that providing a state-funded
service in a religious institution violates the Establishment Clause. It
was not until the 1993 decision of Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School
Distric?2 that the Supreme Court decided that providing special educa-
tion and related services on parochial school grounds did not violate the
Establishment Clause.
A. The Lemon Test and Its Early Interpretations
The first test to determine whether a statute providing funds to pa-
rochial schools crosses the line separating church and state was set out
in 1971 by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman.3 Lemon in-
volved a statutory program that authorized the reimbursement by the
government to private schools for teaching expenses such as salaries
and textbooks.' The Lemon Court considered criteria which had been
developed over the years and delineated an exclusive, three-part test
under which a statute of this type would be unconstitutional. The test
31. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
32. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
33. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
34. The unconstitutional statutes consisted of Rhode Island's 1969 Salary Supplement
Act and Pennsylvania's Nonpublic Elementary Education Act. The Rhode Island statute
"provide[d] for a 15% salary supplement to be paid to teachers in nonpublic schools at which
the average per pupil expenditure on secular education is below the average in public
schools." Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602. The Pennsylvania statute "authorize[d] the state Superin-
tendent of Public Instruction to 'purchase' certain 'secular educational services' from non-
public schools, directly reimbursing those schools solely for teachers' salaries, textbooks, and
instructional materials." Id.
[Vol. 81:79
MISTAKE OF THE IDEA AMENDMENTS ACT
stated: "[T]he statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second,
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances-nor in-
hibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion."'35 If the statute failed to meet any of
the elements, it would be unconstitutional. The statute in Lemon was
found to violate the third "excessive entanglement" element. 6 Al-
though the Lemon test continued to be applied by the courts, its vague-
ness, as well as the Court's own applications of it, left many commenta-
tors and courts unsure of its validity.Y
B. The Zobrest Decision
The Supreme Court's decision in Lemon and other subsequent
cases8 left many parents concerned about how the Court would deal
with the issue of disabled children attending private schools.39 Many
commentators believed that special education and related services were
still able to be provided on-site at the parochial school without violating
the Establishment Clause.4°
After a number of lower courts had offered inconsistent opinions
regarding whether services provided at parochial schools violated the
Establishment Clause,41 the Supreme Court clarified the issue in Zobrest
v. Catalina Foothills School District in 1993.42 James Zobrest was a high
school student who attended elementary school at a. public school for
the deaf and attended junior high at an Arizona public school.43 While
he attended junior high, the school district assigned him a sign-language
35. Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n., 397 U.S. 664,668 (1970) (citation omit-
ted)).
36. Id. at 620.
37. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 1, at 564-65. In 1985, the Supreme Court decided two
cases on the same day regarding the Establishment Clause and the providing of public funds
to benefit parochial school children. School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball (473 U.S. 373
(1985)) and Aguilar v. Felton (473 U.S. 402 (1985)) involved programs that utilized federal
funds to pay public school employees who teach in parochial schools. Both programs were
struck down under the Lemon test because they had the effect of advancing religion, violat-
ing both the second and third prongs of the test. However, these cases have since been over-
ruled by Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
38. See supra note 37.
39. See, e.g., THOMAS F. GUERNSEY & KATHE KLARE, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 114
(1993).
40. Id. at 123-24. See also Martin, supra note 1, at 571.
41. See GUERNSEY, supra note 39, at 124.
42. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
43. Id. at 4.
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interpreter.4' When James entered high school, his parents enrolled him
in a Catholic school and requested the public school board to continue
to provide the interpreter at the Catholic school.45 The school board
denied the request because it felt that providing the service at a private
school would violate the Constitution's Establishment Clause.' Mr. and
Mrs. Zobrest, along with many legal commentators,47 felt this denial
violated their Free Exercise Clause rights to choose where to send their
child to school.' In effect, the Zobrests felt forced to choose between
their religion and a publicly-funded interpreter.49
The Zobrests filed an action in district court claiming first "that the
IDEA and the Free Exercise Clause' required the school board to pro-
vide James with an interpreter" at his Catholic school5' and second that
such action would not violate the Establishment Clause. 2 The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the school board, reason-
ing that a publicly funded "interpreter would act as a conduit for the re-
ligious inculcation of James, thereby promoting James's religious devel-
opment at government expense,"53 an action which violated the
Establishment Clause.' 4
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court, applying the Lemon test,55 de-
termined that "[b]y placing its employee in the sectarian school to per-
form this function, the government would create the appearance that it
was a 'joint sponsor' of the school's activities."56 This violated both the
second and third prongs of the Lemon test, creating a "symbolic union
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Dixie Snow Huefner, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District: A Foot-
hill In Establishment Clause Jurisprudence?, 87 EDuc. LAW REP. 15, 16 & 21-22 (1994). For
another discussion of a Free Exercise Clause violation, see Martin, supra note 1, at 566-68.
48. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 4.
49. Huefner, supra note 47, at 16.
50. The Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution's First Amendment
prohibits the government from acting in a manner that would inhibit one's ability to freely
exercise their religion. U.S. CONST. amend. I. It states, "Congress shall make no law ...
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." Id.
51. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 4.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 5.
54. Id.
55. See supra note 35 and the accompanying text.
56. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 1992),
rev'd, 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
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of government and religion ... ."' The court of appeals also deter-
mined that the Zobrests' Free Exercise rights were not violated because
the state's compelling interest in protecting the Establishment Clause
justified the religious burden.'
In a 5-4 decision written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, concluding that the
Establishment Clause does not prohibit a school district from placing a
public employee in a sectarian school under the IDEA.9 Justice
Rehnquist reiterated the court's consistently-held assertion that
"government programs [such as the IDEA] that neutrally provide bene-
fits to a broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion are
not readily subject to an Establishment Clause challenge just because
sectarian institutions may also receive an attenuated financial benefit."''
Furthermore, because the IDEA distributes funds to children based on
their disability and not on what school they attend, parents have "no fi-
nancial incentive.., to choose a sectarian school."6' The only benefit
received by the school would be the tuition paid by James's parents for
his enrollment.62 Further, by allowing parents the "freedom to select a
school of their choice, [the IDEA] ensures that a government-paid in-
terpreter will be present in a sectarian school only as a result of the pri-
vate decision of the individual parents."3
The Catalina Foothills School District contended that providing
James with an on-site interpreter would violate the prior holdings of
School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball" and Meek v. Pittenger.65 The
Court, however, found the respondent's reliance on these cases
"misplaced."" The Court held that extending aid to James did not im-
permissibly directly subsidize the private school and that any indirect
financial benefit received by the school resulted from the parents' indi-
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 14.
60. Id. at 8. The Supreme Court referred to such cases as Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388
(1983), and Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986). Both cases
held that the Establishment Clause was not violated by a state statute allowing taxpayers to
deduct educational expenses for children who attend sectarian schools.
61. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 473 U.S. 373 (1985). Ball has since been overruled. See supra note 37.
65. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 12 (citing Meek v. Pettenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975)).
66. Id at 13.
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vidual choice. 7 The Court further found that the interpreter's function
is merely "to transmit everything that is said in exactly the same way it
was intended."' The Court differentiated this function from that of a
parochial school teacher or guidance counselor whose job is to instruct,
stating that an interpreter "will neither add to nor subtract from that
environment."69
The Zobrest decision left unresolved many issues regarding the
analysis of FAPE disputes. The requirements of school boards under
the IDEA is an issue that has caused great confusion among the lower
courts.0 The Zobrest majority chose only to address whether the Es-
tablishment Clause was violated and not whether the IDEA required a
sign language interpreter to accompany James to school. This was a key
oversight because now if the IDEA does not require school boards to
provide special education and related services on-site at private schools
in at least some situations, as the Amendments Act provides, the
Zobrest holding is insignificant.
IV. RECENT CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS
Although Zobrest was a small victory for children with disabilities
attending private schools, it left unresolved whether the IDEA requires
a school board to provide special education and related services to these
children on-site. Three circuit court cases, decided just prior to the pas-
sage of the Amendments Act, attempted to answer this question. Un-
fortunately, consistency among these decisions was minimal.
A. K.R. v. Anderson Community School Corp.
K.R. v. Anderson Community School Corp., a 1996 Seventh Circuit
case, involved a seriously disabled six-year-old girl, K.R., who required
a full-time instructional assistant? K.R. was eligible under the IDEA
to receive special educational and related services.73 K.R. needed help
with "positioning for activities, reaching and grasping, self-help skills,
67. Id. at 12.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. For a discussion of some differing, lower court opinions, see infra Part IV.
71. 81 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997).
72. Id. at 676. K.R. suffered from many disabilities including "myelomeningocele, spina
bifida, and hydrocephalus with a shunt, which create[d] difficulties with expressive language,
motor skills, and mobility, requiring her to use a wheelchair." Id.
73. Id.
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motor movements, mobility, and expression."'74 The local school board
told K.R.'s parents that if K.R. attended the public schools, she would
receive "related services for speech therapy, occupational therapy,
transportation, and a full-time instructional assistant,"7 but that she
would not receive the necessary services on-site or a full-time instruc-
tional assistant if she attended the parochial school 6 Despite this deci-
sion, K.R.'s parents enrolled her in the private school where she was
provided with transportation to the therapy services at the public
school, but not with an assistant.77 K.R.'s parents insisted that the
IDEA required the school board to provide the full-time instructional
assistant at K.R.'s parochial school and because the school board re-
fused the service, filed suit in the District Court of Southern Indiana.8
The district court agreed with K.R.'s parents, stating that the IDEA
requires schools to provide "'special education and related services de-
signed to meet the needs of private school children.' 79 Further, the
court stated that these services "'must be comparable in quality, scope,
and opportunity for participation' to services provided to public school
children as outlined in EDGAR.' The court agreed with K.R.'s parents
that a child in need of a full-time instructional assistant would only
benefit if the assistant regularly attended class with her.8
The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the district court about the ex-
tent of comparable benefits that a school board must provide to dis-
abled children attending private schools.2 The Seventh Circuit deter-
mined that the comparability requirement of EDGAR Section
76.654(a)' was limited to "program benefits that [a school district] pro-
vides," 84 and that the limitation allows school districts discretion over
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. K.R. v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1217 (S.D. Ind. 1995), rev'd,
81 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997).
79. Id. at 1221-22 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 300.452).
80. Id. at 1222 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 76.654(a)). "
81. Id.
82. K.R. v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., 81 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated,
117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997).
83. This section of EDGAR states that "program benefits that [a school district] pro-
vides for students enrolled in private schools must be comparable in quality, scope, and op-
portunity for participation to the program benefits that the [school district] provides for stu-
dents enrolled in public schools." 34 C.F.R. § 76.654(a).
84. Anderson, 81 F.3d at 679.
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what benefits to provide to private school students.' The court did
note, though, that "when benefits are provided [to private school stu-
dents],.. . they [must] be comparable to benefits for public school stu-
dents." 6 The court reasoned that, because K.R. was offered the oppor-
tunity to receive the full-time instructional assistant at the public school,
Anderson Community School fulfilled its obligations under EDGAR to
offer comparable benefits along with a "genuine opportunity for equi-
table participation."' In a broad holding, the Seventh Circuit con-
cluded that the IDEA does not require a school board to provide on-
site private school services to disabled students.8 "Rather," the court
concluded, "public schools are given discretion under the law and will
only provide voluntarily placed private school children a genuine op-
portunity for equitable participation."89
The Seventh Circuit never addressed the Establishment Clause issue
because the school board never raised the issue. An entirely different
result may have occurred had the court analyzed the duties of K.R.'s in-
structional assistant, as done in Zobrest. A full-time instructional assis-
tant clearly is more involved with a child's educational development
then a sign language interpreter. If the court determined that the in-
structional assistant's duties had the effect of advancing religion or
adding to the religious environment, the on-site provision of K.R.'s in-
structional assistant would have been denied altogether. To hold oth-
erwise would contradict Zobrest, Lemon, and the Establishment Clause.
The Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the IDEA and EDGAR is
consistent with the Amendments Act. It allows school boards almost
complete discretion to decide what students are entitled to particular
services. This interpretation defeats the purpose of the IDEA. By al-
lowing school boards to decide what services to provide to voluntarily
enrolled private school students, under the reasoning set forth in An-
derson and the Amendments Act, a school board could satisfy its
"genuine opportunity" requirement by only offering services to students
who attend public schools. This result, however, seems to contradict
Congress's original intent to allow private school students "equitable"
participation. Offering certain services only at the public school, par-
ticularly in a situation where a child can only benefit from the service if
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Id. at 678-79.
88. Id. at 680.
89. Id.
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it is received during instruction, would not be equitable at all. In fact, it
may actually preclude the child from attending the private school alto-
gether.
B. Russman v. Sobol
Later in 1996, the Second Circuit ruled on an issue similar to the one
faced by the Seventh Circuit in Anderson. Until the age of nine, Col-
leen Russman, a mentally disabled student, attended a publicly-funded
school set aside for students with disabilities.' In 1991, Colleen's par-
ents and the Watervliet, New York school district agreed that Colleen
should be "mainstreamed" into a regular classroom." This goal re-
quired that Colleen have access to a consultant teacher and a teacher's
aid as well as speech and occupational therapy.9 The Russmans asked
the school district to implement Colleen's individual education program
at the Catholic school that her two sisters attended.93 The school district
denied the Russmans' request, stating that providing a consultant
teacher and a teacher's aid at Colleen's school would violate the Estab-
lishment Clause. 4 The school district did agree, however, to provide
speech and occupational therapy at a neutral site.9' Because the Russ-
mans could not afford the support services, they enrolled Colleen in the
public school and filed an action claiming that the IDEA required the
school district to provide the on-site services to Colleen.96
The District Court of Northern New York agreed with the Russ-
mans that the failure to provide on-site services was a violation of the
IDEA and its regulationsY The court followed an analysis similar to
that followed by the Supreme Court in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills
School District.s As the Zobrest Court recognized a large distinction
between the duties of a classroom teacher and a sign language inter-
preter,9 the district court judge in Russman found no distinction be-
tween the duties of a consultant teacher, a teacher's aid, and a sign lan-
90. 85 F.3d 1050 (2d Cir. 1996), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Russman v. Bd. of Educ., 945 F. Supp. 37 (N.D.N.Y. 1995), affd, 85 F.3d 1050 (2d
Cir. 1996), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997).
98. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
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guage interpreter.'# As in Zobrest, Colleen's special education teachers
would "neither add to nor subtract from the sectarian environment."''
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision,
broadly interpreting Zobrest"0 In applying the test for an Establish-
ment Clause challenge outlined in Zobrest,'O the Second Circuit deter-
mined: "First, the assistance is a neutral government service made
available without regard to religion. Second, the [services will be pro-
vided] at [Colleen's school] solely because of a decision made by the
Russman family. Third, the special education benefits flow directly to
Colleen and do not financially benefit [her school]."'"
The Second Circuit continued by clarifying what types of publicly
funded services are allowed in a private school. The court found no dis-
tinction between "mechanical assistance, such as verbatim translations
by sign language," as in Zobrest, and cognitive assistance such as a
teacher's aid and consultant. 5 The court reasoned that "[t]o hold oth-
erwise would interpret Zobrest in a way that distinguishes between stu-
dents with physical disabilities.., and those with mental disabilities,...
for purposes of the IDEA."'' 6
The court's interpretation of Zobrest may have expanded the hold-
ing much further than the Supreme Court had anticipated. The Second
Circuit did not analyze or even differentiate the tasks of a mechanical
assistant and a cognitive assistant. The court stated that distinguishing
between students with different disabilities would be an incorrect inter-
100. Russman, 945 F. Supp. at 42-43. The judge found that the duties of the consulting
teacher involved one half hour per day teaching the child and one half hour per day consult-
ing with the child's classroom teachers. The duties of the teaching aide consisted of teaching
support. Id. at 42.
101. Id.
102. Russman v. Sobol, 85 F.3d 1050 (2d Cir. 1996), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997).
103. The court enumerated the test as follows:
Under Zobrest, the provision of governmental services to a religious school will sur-
vive a First Amendment challenge if: (i) the services are provided in a neutral
manner without regard to religion; (ii) the services are provided at the parochial
school not as a result legislative choice but rather as a result of private choice of the
individual utilizing the services; and (iii) the funds traceable to the government do
not "find their way into the sectarian schools' coffers."
Id. at 1053 (quoting Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10). See also supra text accompanying notes 61-64.
104. Russman, 85 F.3d at 1053-54 (citation omitted).
105. Id. at 1054 ("The primary purpose of both a sign language interpreter and a
teaching aid is solely to make the material intelligible to the disabled student, not to create a
particular religious message or to advance a particular religious viewpoint.").
106. Id.
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pretation of Zobrest.1°7 However, Zobrest appears to distinguish only
between services provided, not individual disabilities.'" In the religion-
based curriculum of a parochial school, a cognitive assistant may have
to teach a mentally disabled child in a way that directly promotes relig-
ious beliefs so that the child understands what is being taught in his or
her classes. This type of assistance could violate the Establishment
Clause holding of Zobrest.
The second part of the Russman decision interpreted the IDEA to
determine whether it required the Watervilet School District to provide
Colleen's special education teachers at her Catholic school.1°9 The Sec-
ond Circuit agreed with the K.R. v. Anderson Community School Cor-
poration10 court that the IDEA affords different rights to private school
students than public school students."' It disagreed, though, with the
Seventh Circuit's view that "Congress intended to give disabled stu-
dents voluntarily attending private school a lesser entitlement.""2 The
Second Circuit believed that the difference stemmed from the IDEA's
language professing that the states' provision requirement is only lim-
ited "'to the extent consistent with the number and location' of disabled
children voluntarily in private schools."..
In its review of the IDEA's language, the Second Circuit concluded
that the denial of such on-site services could occur only where
"economies of scale in providing the services at [the private school] ex-
ist""14 or where there would be "significant additional costs... borne by
107. Id. at 1054.
108. The Supreme Court's focus throughout Zobrest was on the specific service of pro-
viding a sign language interpreter. The Court ended its decision with the statement that "[i]f
a handicapped child chooses to enroll in a sectarian school, the Establishment Clause does
not prevent the school district from furnishing him with a sign language interpreter .... .
Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13-14 (emphasis added).
109. Russman, 85 F.3d at 1054-57.
110. 81 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997).
111. Russman, 85 F.3d at 1056.
112. Id. (quoting Anderson, 81 F.3d at 678).
113. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(4)(A)).
114. Id. The court offered as an example of permissible discretion a situation where
one occupational therapist can effectively aid three students and a school district employs
three occupational therapists and fourteen students disabled students. In this situation, the
school board would not be required to provide a therapist at a private school if only one dis-
abled student attended the private school because the per student cost of the therapist would
be higher at the private school. However, an on-site therapist would be required to be pro-
vided by the school board if five of the fourteen students attended the private school because
the cost of providing the therapist at the private school would be identical to that at the pub-
lic school. Id.
1997]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
the state... 5 The court reasoned that where the costs are identical in
providing the services at a public and private school, it would "make lit-
tle sense" to provide the services only at the public school."6 Had the
court interpreted the IDEA differently, disabled private school students
would be limited to receiving "little more than after-school services.' 1 7
This holding was a very liberal interpretation of both the Zobrest
decision and the IDEA. Parents of almost any disabled child in the
Second Circuit can now send their child to a private school for only the
cost of tuition. The problem is that this could result in astronomical ex-
penses for school boards. Any child that requires only a purely auto-
mated assistive device, such as a wheelchair, hearing FM system, or spe-
cially designed desk, would receive it from the state because the cost
incurred would be the same no matter where the child attends school.
The problem is determining where to draw the line with the economies
of scale. If a school board employs three occupational therapists for
every fourteen disabled students at a public school, what is the mini-
mum number of students that must attend the private school before
therapy will be received on-site?"8 Economies of scale would say five,
but what would happen if six attended the private school? One thera-
pist might not be effectively able to aid all six, requiring a new therapist
to be hired. Situations like this could lead to a shortage of funds re-
flecting back to the students that the school boards are attempting to
aid.
C. Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board
In Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board,"9 the Fifth Cir-
cuit offered a burden shifting test that acts as a compromise between
the Seventh and Second Circuit's holdings. The facts were very similar
to those in Zobrest."
Charlie Cefalu suffered from a hearing impairment and required an
on-site sign language interpreter.'' Charlie attended a public school un-
til 1993 when his parents enrolled him in a private school following the
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1057.
118. See supra note 114.
119. 103 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1997), withdrawn and superseded on reh'g by 117 F.3d 231
(5th Cir. 1997).
120. For a review of the facts in Zobrest, see supra notes 43-49 and the accompanying
text.
121. Cefalu, 103 F.3d at 395.
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Zobrest decision.'2 As in Anderson and Russman, the school board re-
fused to provide the needed special services at Charlie's private school
and the Cefalus filed suit."
The District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana agreed with
the decision of the District Court of Southern Indiana in Anderson
which had been handed down just three months earlier. In fact, the Ce-
falu court "adopt[ed the] opinion in Anderson as its opinion in this
case."'24 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Cefalu's and required the school board to provide Charlie with an in-
terpreter at his private school.'"
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and
remanded the case in light of a new burden shifting test." The Fifth
Circuit's burden shifting test required "the private school student [to]
make an initial showing of a genuine need for on-site services, based
upon more than mere convenience."'" If the student shows a genuine
need, the school board must provide the services unless it can show a
justifiable reason, either economic or non-economic, for denying the
services.' 2' Should the school board carry its burden, the student must
then show "that the [school board's] position is inconsistent with the
IDEA and its regulations, or is not rationally supportable, or is other-
wise arbitrary."'29
This test combined the "school board discretion" holding in Ander-
son and the "economies of scale" holding in Russman. The Fifth Circuit
reasoned that although the IDEA does not mandate on-site services for
voluntarily enrolled private school students, the refusal of on-site serv-
ices inhibits these students' right to a "'genuine opportunity for equita-
ble participation. ' ' However, the court went on to state that "these
limited resources must be distributed in a manner that allows the provi-
sion of necessary services to the greatest number of qualified students..
.""' Therefore, the court reasoned that discretion should be "exercised
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 907 F. Supp 966, 968 (1995), vacated,
103 F.3d 393, withdrawn and superseded on reh'g by 117 F.3d 231 (5th Cir. 1997).
125. Id.
126. Cefalu, 103 F.3d at 398-99.
127. Id. at 398.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 397 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 76.651).
131. Id.
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in a way that assures the private school student a 'genuine opportunity
for equitable participation in the program,' but, that also considers the
'number of eligible private school students and their needs." '3 2
In essence, this decision narrows the Russman holding. Cefalu holds
that on-site private school services usually will be required when the
provision cost is the same at the public school.33 However, should a
school district offer a justifiable reason for denial, such as excessive
travel by state employees or a showing that the child would receive
comparably greater benefits than her public schoolmates, the school has
the discretion to deny the services.
The Fifth Circuit dismissed the Establishment Clause issue in Cefalu
with one sentence: "In June 1993, the Supreme Court held that a public
school district did not violate the Establishment Clause by providing
services under the IDEA to students voluntarily attending [private]
schools."'' Because the facts in Cefalu are almost identical to those in
Zobrest, the Fifth Circuit's Establishment Clause interpretation does
not affect Cefalu, but it could create a problem for lower courts. The
Zobrest court found that providing an on-site sign language interpreter
did not violate the Establishment Clause because the interpreter would
"neither add to nor subtract from [the sectarian] environment.' ' 35 This
conclusion was reached after an analysis of the duties performed by the
interpreter. Lower courts could interpret the Fifth Circuit's holding to
mean that no IDEA services provided by a public school district would
violate the Establishment Clause. It is doubtful that this was the Su-
preme Court's intent.
V. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
It is clear from the three different holdings of the Second, Fifth, and
Seventh Circuit Courts that there existed a great need for a unified in-
terpretation of the IDEA's requirements on school districts. Congress's
passage of the IDEA Amendments Act of 1997 would appear to have
solved this problem. Unfortunately, though, in Congress's tunnel-
visioned attempt to create uniformity among the courts, the Amend-
ments Act will result in hurting many of the children that Congress de-
signed the IDEA to help.
The Amendments Act states that the school boards are not required
132. Id. at 396 (quoting 34 C.F.R § 76.651).
133. Id. at 398.
134. Id. at 395 (referring to Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist. 509 U.S. 1 (1993)).
135. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist. 509 U.S. 1, 13 (1993).
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to pay for special education and related services of children voluntarily
attending private school. In other words, regardless of the cost or indi-
vidual child's circumstances, the decision of whether a school board
pays for a disabled private school child's needs is completely up to the
school board. A related service, such as a hearing aid, could cost the
same whether the child attends a public or private school and could still
be denied simply because of their school choice. A mentally disabled
child, ready to be mainstreamed into a regular classroom, may benefit
more by attending the same private school where his or her siblings at-
tend and where his or her mother teaches, but could still be denied
services. Even if the cost would be less to the school board because the
child's mother would act as an aid, services such as a wheelchair or
speech therapist could be denied. Legislative history and common
sense suggest that this is not what Congress intended.
This Comment recommends that Congress rescind the Amendments
Act and require school boards to provide on-site special education and
related services to disabled, private school children based on a case by
case analysis. Courts should still be allowed to render the final decision
regarding where services should be provided because each disabled
child's situation is different. The following is a proposal for the analysis
of cases in which the parent of a disabled, private school child requests a
school board to provide on-site special education and related services.
The five step analysis is intended to be used by courts, but could also be
enacted as a guideline for school boards to follow.
In sum, the analysis is composed of the following steps: First, the
court should identify the nature of each needed service. Second, the
needed service should be analyzed in light of the second and third
prongs of the Lemon test. Third, the court should determine whether
the cost of the service differs if it is provided at the child's private
school rather than a neutral site. Fourth, in the case of non-economic
denial, the court should determine if the school board's "position is in-
consistent with the IDEA and its regulations, or is not rationally sup-
portable, or otherwise arbitrary."'' 6 Finally, in the case of an economic
denial, the court should decide if, based on the child's disability, the off-
site service actually provides a "general opportunity for equitable par-
ticipation with benefits comparable to those received by public school
students." 3"
1. Identify the nature of each needed service. The court must first
136. Cefalu, 103 F.3d at 398.
137. 34 C.F.R. § 76.651(a)(1).
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determine whether the child requires an assistive technical device or the
assistance of a state employee. If the child only needs a technical device
to assist him or her in receiving instruction, such as an FM hearing sys-
tem or a Braille reader,13 8 the analysis will stop here and the school dis-
trict should provide the device. An assistive technical device will
merely "transmit everything that is said in exactly the same way it was
intended" '139 as outlined in Zobrest. Further, the cost of supplying such a
device will be the same no matter which school the child attends. The
device may require occasional maintenance, but courts should view this
as an additional service subject to the rest of the analysis. Whether
maintenance will be provided on site will be up to the discretion of the
school board.
Anderson, Russman, and Cefalu all involved the services of a state
employee, so under this five-part analysis these courts would continue
to the next step.
2. Analyze the needed service in light of the second and third prongs
of the Lemon test. Although the Zobrest court never mentioned the
Lemon test, it analyzed the tasks required of a sign language interpreter
compared to that of a classroom teacher in order to determine whether
it constituted a violation of the Establishment Clause. As was done in
Zobrest and Russman, a court must analyze the requested service to de-
termine whether it would have the "primary effect of promoting relig-
ion'0 or mixing government and religion. This analysis is necessary
because if the provided service violated the Establishment Clause, the
IDEA could not require the service.
To prevent a public employee from promoting a parochial school's
religious doctrine, a court may have to distinguish between cognitive
and interpretive services, as the Second Circuit failed to do in Russ-
man.' Depending on the extent of the cognitive assistance needed, the
state-provided aid may actually be advancing the religious teachings of
a parochial school in an attempt to help the child understand the day's
instruction. This would result in an "excessive entanglement of gov-
ernment with religion"' 42 and the court should deny the on-site service.
However, if the service is to be provided in a non-secular private school,
the analysis may continue no matter what the outcome of this test.
138. Huefner, supra note 47, at 27.
139. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 12.
140. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 105-106.
142. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 12.
[Vol. 81:79
MISTAKE OF THE IDEA AMENDMENTS ACT
3. Determine whether the cost of the service differs if it is provided at
the child's private school rather than a neutral site. Should a court de-
termine that a service will cost the same regardless of its location, the
service should be provided at the child's private school unless the school
board presents a non-economic, justifiable reason for denial. This ele-
ment of the test utilizes the "economies of scale" view presented in
Russman and Cefalu, but does not require the initial showing of on-site
need as required by Cefalu."4' The drafters of the IDEA clearly in-
tended private school students to benefit from the program144 and the
Supreme Court has agreed that services should be provided to students
based on need, not based on where they attend school. 45
Cefalu required a showing of a genuine need, not one of mere con-
venience, in order for a school board to provide on-site services."6 This
required showing makes little sense when the purpose of the IDEA is to
benefit disabled students regardless of whether they attend a public or
private school. 7 If the cost is the same to provide the service on-site at
the private school, there is no reason why the child should be required
to show an on-site genuine need. Providing the service at the student's
private school for mere convenience may actually be more beneficial
for the child. Private school classrooms are traditionally smaller in stu-
dent enrollment than public school classrooms, so the child will receive
more individual attention. Additionally, as in Colleen Russman's case,
if a child's siblings already attend the private school, the disabled child
may feel more comfortable when he or she is "mainstreamed" into a
regular classroom knowing that his or her siblings are close by. When
differences in cost are not a determining factor, the burden should not
be on the student to show on-site need, but on the school to show some
non-economic reason for denial.
Should the court determine that the cost will be more to provide the
service on the private school premises, the school board should be al-
lowed the discretion to determine how it will create a genuine opportu-
nity for participation by the child. The East Baton Rouge Parish School
Board in Cefalu likely would have a strong argument not to provide the
sign language interpreter at Charlie Cefalu's school. Economies of
scale would dictate that even if there is only one other student in Char-
143. See supra text accompanying notes 126-132.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
145. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13.
146. Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd. 103 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1997), with-
drawn and superseded on reh'g by 117 F.3d 231 (5th Cir. 1997).
147. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412,1413(d) (1988).
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lie's grade at the public school, while he attended the private school, the
cost to provide the interpreter would double. One interpreter for each
child at each school would have to be hired, but if both children at-
tended the public school, only one would be needed. However, the only
way this argument would work is if the other child is in all of the same
classes as Charlie. If Charlie is the only hearing impaired student in the
fourth grade, a separate interpreter would have to be assigned to his
classes, while the other interpreters service children in the other grades.
If another interpreter must be hired for Charlie, it would make little dif-
ference, cost-wise, where the services are performed.
Anderson and Russman also involved children requiring personal
aid; however, the children in these cases had much more serious dis-
abilities than those faced by Charlie Cefalu. Economies of scale argu-
ments would be much less effective in these cases. These children re-
quire individual attention from their consultant teachers and
instructional assistants. A second child could not utilize the services of
these aids, therefore, the cost will be the same whether the children at-
tend the public or private school. Provision of the on-site consultant
teacher and instructional assistant should be mandated barring any
Constitutional issue.
4. In the case of non-economic denial, determine if the school board's
"position is inconsistent with the IDEA and its regulations, or is not ra-
tionally supportable, or otherwise arbitrary. "14 This is the last element
of the Cefalu test. When a school board denies services based on a non-
economic concern, the student should still be afforded the opportunity
to dispute the validity of the reason. Justifiable reasons for denial other
than cost will be rare. The IDEA was established to help fund the spe-
cial education needs of individual children with disabilities. 149 Its pur-
pose is economic."O Most reasons for denial will either be economically
rooted or, if non-economic, inconsistent with the IDEA or arbitrary.
A school board could attempt to argue that providing the service at
a parochial school would violate a state statute prohibiting such an ac-
tion even though it would not violate the Establishment Clause. Unfor-
tunately for the state, the federal IDEA would preempt the state statute
and require the service be provided on-site. This would clearly be
within the intent of the framers as the pass-through system of non-
148. Cefalu, 103 F.3d at 398.
149. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(7),(8) and (c).
150. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
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participating states indicates. 5'
5. In the case of on-site denial, determine whether the off-site service
actually offers benefits comparable to that of the public school children.
When a school board offers a justifiable reason, economic or non-
economic, for on-site denial, the school board has discretion to deter-
mine where the service will be provided. However, the court's final step
in this analysis must be to determine if the services that will be provided
actually offer a genuine opportunity for equitable participation with
benefits comparable to those provided to public school students. This
type of analysis must be done on a case by case basis weighing many
factors.
If a school board chooses to only offer the services at a neutral site
or on public school grounds, the court must look at the totality of the
circumstances regarding the education of the child. Because the IDEA
focuses on providing for the individual student,152 the court should con-
sider the nature of the services offered by the school board in relation
to the individual child's needs. Physical, occupational, and some forms
of speech therapy would not significantly hinder a child's education if
they were not provided at the child's school. However, many disabili-
ties, such as a hearing impairment or one requiring some form of per-
sonal assistance, do not allow dual enrollment. In these situations, a
child would be precluded altogether from attending the private school
because to benefit from the instruction, the service would have to be
provided during class. This may violate a child's right to a genuine op-
portunity for equitable participation as well as his or her right to com-
parable benefits.5 3
In the event the court determines that the child's needs would be
better served at the school he or she attends, the court should order that
the services be provided at the private school. In making this determi-
nation, the court should also weigh the economies of scale of all the
services needed by the child, not just the costs of the individual services.
The child's family situation, such as where the child's siblings attend
school, may also be taken into account. Finally, the court should con-
sider any condition unique to the child that may affect his or her educa-
tional development.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
152. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(c), 1401(a)(19) (discussing the individualized education pro-
gram).
153. 34 C.F.R. § 76.654.
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VI. CONCLUSION
For over two decades, courts have wrestled with interpreting the
IDEA and its predecessor, the EAHCA. The issue of whether a public
school board is required to provide special education and related serv-
ices at a private school voluntarily attended by a disabled child has most
recently surfaced since the Supreme Court's decision in Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills School District.'T 4 Congress answered this question
with the passage of the IDEA Amendments Act, allowing the school
boards to determine whether or not they will pay for the special educa-
tion at a private school. Due to the excessive costs of special education
and related services and the lack of funds available to school boards,
Congress has essentially taken away these services for private school
students. To date, the Supreme Court has vacated and remanded the
Anderson and Russman cases in light of the Amendments Act.'55 Cefalu
was originally vacated and remanded in light of the test the Fifth Circuit
offered.'56 However, in July 1997, the Fifth Circuit granted a petition for
rehearing and, following the Amendments Act, found that the school
board was not required to provide Charlie with a sign language inter-
preter.5
7
It appears as though Congress was not fully aware of the impact that
the Amendments Act will make. In essence, Congress has impeded the
disabled peoples' rights movement by dictating where disabled children
must be educated. Disabled children have a statutory right to a "free
appropriate public education." Whether that right is provided should
not depend on the name of a child's school.
WILLIAM L. DOWLING
154. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
155. K.R. v. Anderson Community School District, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997); Board. of
Educ. v. Russman, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997).
156. Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 103 F.3d 393, 398-99 (5th Cir. 1997)
withdrawn and superseded on reh'g by 117 F.3d 231 (5th Cir. 1997).
157. Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 117 F.3d 231 (5th Cir. 1997).
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